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NOTES
and LeBlanc cases. The decision is also consistent with a deci-
sion rendered in Mississippi. In Texas Gulf Producing Co. v.
Griffith, the Mississippi Supreme Court, confronted with a simi-
lar fact situation, allowed cancellation of the lease on the por-
tion of the tract lying outside the unit and said that to hold
otherwise would "be a violation of the constitutional guaranty
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law." A most significant point in the instant case
is that plaintiff lessor was able to overcome a geologist's testi-
mony by showing that he had received from a prudent operator
a bona fide offer to drill if the land was freed from the lease.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Romero v. Humble
Oil and Refining Co.7 had taken a step in that direction, but
had required the plaintiff's offeror to give assurance that he
would drill before the lease to defendant would be cancelled
for nondevelopment. Because of the importance the court in
the instant case seemed to place on the fact that a well had
been drilled during the primary term in both the Hunter and
the LeBlanc cases, it is not entirely clear whether the result
reached in the instant case would have been the same had the
lessee drilled during the primary term. However, the remedy
afforded the lessor in the instant case was probably within the
contemplation of the court in the Hunter case.8 It is submitted
that regardless of when the well is drilled on the unit, if the
lessor can prove that the lessee has not adequately developed
the portion of the leased premises outside the unit, then the
lease on that portion should be cancelled.
Billy H. Hines
MINERAL RIGHTS-INTERPRETATION OF LEASE-EFFECT OF SIGNING
A DIVISION ORDER
Plaintiff lessors sued to cancel a mineral lease for failure of
lessee to drill or pay delay rentals as required by the terms of
the contract.' The lessee had completed and placed in production
6. 65 So.2d 447, 452 (Miss. 1953), 2 OIL & GAs REP. 1103, 1111 (1953).
7. 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952), 1 OIL & GAS REP. 358 (1952).
8. See language quoted page 854 supra.
1. Section 4 of the lease provides in part: "If operations for the drilling
of a well be not commenced on said land, or any unitized area hereunder,
on or before the 3rd day of September, 1949, this lease shall terminate,
unless Lessee on or before that date pays to lessor a rental. Wilcox v.
Shell Oil Co., 76 So.2d 416, 419 (La. 1954).
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a well on land other than that covered by the lease in question.
Thereafter the defendant, without knowledge of the .plaintiffs,
formed a voluntary operating unit around the producing well
including a portion of the land leased from plaintiffs.2 A declara-
tion of the unit was placed of record without plaintiffs' knowl-
edge on the day before delay rentals were due. Defendant did
not pay delay rentals, relying on the following provision of the
lease:
"5. . . .The commencement of a well or the completion of a
well to production, and the production of oil or gas there-
from, on any portion of an operating unit in which all or any
part of the land described herein is embraced shall have the
same effect, under the terms of this lease, as if a well were
commenced or completed on the land embraced by this
le a se. .. .. 3
About two months after failing to make payment of delay rentals
under the lease, defendant sent plaintiffs a division order, which
stated their interest in the production from the unit referred
to above. Plaintiffs signed it and cashed four royalty checks.
On appeal from judgment for defendant, held, reversed. The
obligation of the contract requiring drilling unless payment of
delay rentals was made had not been satisfied; and plaintiffs, by
signing the division order and cashing the royalty checks, were
not estopped to urge cancellation since they were ignorant of
the formation and recordation of the unit by defendant. Wilcox
v. Shell Oil Co., 76 So.2d 416 (La. 1954).
Louisiana courts have recognized that production from any
part of a unitized area will keep the lease in force for land, all
or part of which is included in the unit, and has the same effect
as if the production had been obtained directly from the leased
land.4 The parties to a lease may, however, provide effect of
operations on a unit or pool. In such cases the intention of the
2. Prior to this voluntary operating unit, which affected the FT sands,
the Commissioner of Conservation had issued an order unitizing an area
including some of plaintiffs' land, but only as to the FX and FV sands. A
well was drilled unproductively into the last mentioned sands, and pulled
up to the FT sands where oil was discovered. Since the Commissioner's
order did not affect the FT sands and the voluntary pooling declaration
had, not then been recorded, the well was brought in on non-unitized lands.
3. Section 5 of the lease. Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co., 76 So.2d 416, 419 (La.
1954).
4. Smith v. Carter Oil Co., 104 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. La. 1952); LeBlanc v.
Danciger Oil & Refining Co., 218 La. 463, 49 So.2d 855 (1950); Hunter Co. v.
Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947); Crichton v. Lee, 209 La, 561,
25 So.2d 229 (1946).
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parties controls and the court must rely on general principles
of contract interpretation. 5
In the instant case the defendant, relying upon the lease
provision quoted above, contended that the existence at the due
date for rentals of (1) a unit validly formed under the per-
missive unitization clause 6 and (2) a producing well on the unit
was sufficient to keep the lease in effect. The court found that
the clause in question provided three types of operations on a
unit comprising some of plaintiffs' land which would preserve
the lease: (a) starting a well on the unit; (b) completing a well
to production on the unit; or (c) production from a well com-
pleted on the unit.7 Since no unit was created until the day
before the due date for rentals and after completion of the well,
none of the conditions was met.
Prior to the recordation of the voluntary pooling by defen-
dant, an order of the Conservation Department had unitized
some of plaintiffs' land, but as to different sands. Since plain-
tiffs were ignorant of the voluntary pooling arrangements of
defendant lessee, and were relying on the former pool by the
Conservation Department, their action in signing the division
order and accepting the royalties could not serve as a basis
for estoppel.8 There is ample authority that the plea of estop-
pel is ineffective against one having no knowledge of the factsY
The party asserting this defense bears the burden of proving
the elements of his theory, among which is the knowledge of
5. Dobbins v. Hodges, 208 La. 143, 23 So.2d 26 (1945); Robinson v. Horton,
197 La. 919, 2 So.2d 647 (1941); Art. 1945 et seq., LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
6. Section 5 of the lease contains the voluntary pooling clause: "Lessee
shall have the right as to all or any part of the land herein leased, without
lessor's consent to combine the lease, mineral and royalty rights, owned by
lessor and lessee and created by this lease, with any other lease or leases
• . . so as to create . . . one or more operating units. Wilcox v. Shell
Oil Co., 76 So.2d 416, 419 (1954).
7. Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co., 76 So.2d 416, 420 (1954).
8. There is, however, authority from other jurisdictions to the general
effect that signing a division order can operate as an estoppel against the
royalty owner. Dale v. Case, 64 So.2d 344 (Miss. 1953), 2 0a & GAS REP.
962 (1953), held that signing an erroneous division order estopped the min-
eral owner from proceeding against the producing oil company, although
they did have a right against other owners who had been overpaid as a
result of the error. Snider v. Snider, 255 P.2d 273 (Okla. 1953), 2 OIL & GAS
REP. 711 (1953), while holding that a division order is no longer effective
when the signer dies, did intimate that although revocable, and not binding,
the division order would serve as estoppel for accrued payments.
9. Little v. Barbe, 195 La. 1071, 198 So. 368 (1940); Parker v. Ohio Oil
Co., 191 La. 896, 186 So. 604 (1939); Succession of Valdes, 44 So.2d 151 (La.
App. 1950); Jones v. Alford, 172 So. 213 (La. App. 1937).
19551 NOTES
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the opposing party.1 In the instant case, the peculiar sequence
of pooling arrangements was sufficient to convince the court that
plaintiffs were not aware of the facts. Consequently, it seems
clear that the legal principles applied by the court are well
grounded in the Louisiana jurisprudence. Although this case
was compromised pending decision on the application for re-
hearing, it is an expression of judicial thought on the lease
clause involved and can serve as a guide for future action to
all parties interested in mineral operations.
William D. Brown III
SALES-REDHIBITORY AcTIoN-ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT-
DIFFERENCE IN PRESCRIPTIVE PERIODS
Plaintiff purchased paint from defendant which defendant
had advertised as "guaranteed 100% Mold and Mildew-Resistant
All-Purpose White Paint." Plaintiff used the paint on his own
house and on another. Within less than a year after application
of the paint mildew appeared on both houses. Suit was brought
to recover the cost of the paint and the expenses incurred in its
application and removal. The trial court held that the action was
one in redhibition and, since the suit had been instituted more
than two years after the date of the sale and more than one year
after the discovery of the defects and deficiences in the paint, the
defendant's plea of prescription was sustained. On appeal, plain-
tiff urged that the controversy was not controlled by the one-
year rule of prescription applicable to the action of redhibition,
but instead by that of ten years since the action was to recover
damages for breach of contract. The Orleans Court of Appeal
stated that "the Supreme Court must still be of the view that
... this is a redhibitory action," and held, affirmed. "[I]n such
a case as this, the party who sustains loss is entitled to 'damages'
but . .. those damages are such as are contemplated by Article
2545 of the Civil Code .... [C]onsequently the claim is barred
by the prescription period of one year in accordance with Article
2534, if the seller did not know of the defect, or Article 2546 if the
10. Harvey v. Richard, 200 La. 97, 7 So.2d 674 (1942); Hayward v. Caro-
lina Ins. Co., 51 So.2d 405 (La. App. 1951). Ratification, while not entirely
equitable In nature, must include an intent to confirm, and therefore -re-
quires knowledge of all facts surrounding the questioned transaction. Art.
2272, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870; Otis v. Texas Co., 153 La. 384, 96 So. 1 (1923);
Lacaze v. Kelsoe, 185 So. 676 (La. App. 1939).
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